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STATE OF UTAH 
DON GERALD WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiff, 
\'S. 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, 
as Administrator of the State Insurance Fund, 
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J ALLEN SCOTT, by and through his 
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vs. Plaintiff, 
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as Administrator of the State Insurance Fund, 
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Estate of Robert Walton, Deceased, 
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UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, 
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ANGELO MELO, WAULSTINE McNEELY and 
WILLIAM J. ROEDEL, 
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RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ON REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This Petition for Rehearing is related specifical-
ly to the Jeanette Walton and Boyd Simmons cases 
and involves the question of whether those two 
cases involving claims arising after the c 1 aim in 
Worthen should be denied the benefit of Worthen. 
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DECISION ON ORIGINAL HEARING 
This Honorable Court reversed all of the consoli-
dated cases by applying to them the rule of M.c-
Connel v. Commission of Finance, 13 Utah 2d 395, 375 P.2d 
94 (1962). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING 
Your Petitioners seek to have the Court recon-
sider its decision as it applies to the particular cir-
cumstances in the Walton and Simmons cases and 
to reconsider the legally significant cut-off date. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Trial Court consolidated several cases for 
appeal involving similar questions of law. Unfor-
tunately, however, the dates with respect to each of 
these cases were different. This Court in making its 
decision may not have fully understood the set of 
circumstances in the Walton case and the Simmons 
case, whose claims both arose after the claim in 
Worthen. To avoid any confusion with respect to the 
dates of legal significance, Petitioners have en-
closed on the last page of this Brief, a critical Time 
Path Schedule comparing the important dates of 
Worthen with those of Walton and Simmons. 
The claim in Worthen arose on March 18, 1966, 
the date the tortfeasor's carrier paid the settlement 
check into Court, in trust, pending the outcome of 
the dispute. Thereafter, the Insurance Fund (which 
wasn't a party) voluntarily intervened to settle the 
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dispute. On March 25, 1966, the District Court in 
Worthen, ordered the Insurance Fund to pay its 
proportionate share of the attorney fee. It was that 
March 25, 1966 Court Order which this Court in 
Worthen affirmed on April 3, 1967. 
In Walton, the plaintiff received a Judgment in 
the Federal District Court on November 22, 1964. 
That decision was appealed to the Circuit Court of 
Appeals which on August 31, 1966, affirmed the 
Judgment. On December 21, 1966, plaintiff paid the 
Insurance Fund under protest. Plaintiff thereafter 
on January 20, 1969, filed suit against the Fund to 
collect the amount paid under protest. 
In Simmons, the plaintiff received a settlement 
in the latter part of January, 1967. On January 31, 
1967, the plaintiff paid the Insurance Fund under 
protest, and on January 20, 1969, filed suit against 
the Fund to collect the amount paid. 
The right of the State Insurance Fund to be re-
imbursed at all is entirely dependent on; (1) there 
being a settlement or a final Judgment; and, (2) a 
fund created out of such settlement or judgment. 
Those two conditions came into existance in Worth-
en on March 18, 1966, in Walton on December 21, 
1966, and in Simmons on January 31, 1967. Accord-
ing to Judge Croft's Memorandum Decision of June 
27, 1969, the above dates for Walton and Simmons 
would constitute the date upon which the claim 





THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER THE LEGALLY 
SIGNIFICANT CUT-OFF DATE. 
Strictly speaking a "prospective opinion" is one 
in which the new rule of law applies to future cases 
only and not even to the case before the Court. The 
April 3, 1967 Worthen decision was not a "prospec-
tive opinion" but had "limited retroactive effect" 
because it was applied to the parties in that case on 
a claim which arose on March 18, 1966. 
It was unclear, however, the extent to which the 
Worthen decision should be given retroactive effect 
with respect to claims such as in the Walton and 
Simmons cases which arose after the claim in 
Worthen and which were not even the subject of 
litigation until after the Worthen decision was an-
nounced. 
Appellant in his brief has erroneously contend-
ed that the Supreme Court has "looked with favor 
in having prospective application only." In deter-
mining whether to apply an overruling decision 
retroactively in such situations the Supreme Court 
has not discarded applying its decisions retroactive-
ly. In the most recent decisions, the Court has ap-
plied "limited retroactive effect" to the overruling 
decisions as the Court did in Worthen. Instead of 
arbitrarily applying the date of the overruling de-
cision as the cut-off date, the Supreme Court has 
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applied different cut-off dates with respect to those 
events which occurred prior to any announcement 
of a new rule or where litigation of such events was 
not commenced until after the announcement of a 
new rule. 
The Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United 
Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 20 Led 2d 1231 
(1968), held that the new rule in American Tobacco Co. 
v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 90 Led 1575 (1946), was 
applicable to that case where litigation began after 
the date of the American Tobacco decision, but in-
volved conduct which had occurred prior thereto. 
The Court emphasized that there was no such justi-
fiable reliance as would warrant the American To-
bacco decision to have prospective effect only. 
The Supreme Court in Cipriano l'. Hauma, 395 U.S. 
701, 23 Led 2d 647 (1969), announced the new rule 
to the effect that it was unconstitutional to limit the 
righ to vote in elections for approval of the issuance 
of municipal utility bonds tc just property taxpay-
ers. The Court applied the new rule to the parties 
in that case and further extended the "limited retro-
active effect" by stating that the new rule would 
apply only where, under state law, the time for 
challenging the election results had not expired, or 
in cases which were brought within the time speci-
fied by state law for challenging the election and 
which were not yet final. 
The Supreme Court inLear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 
653, 23 Led 2d 610 (1969), likewise announced a new 
rule by repudiating the doctrine that a patent 
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licensee was estopped to challenge the validity of 
a patent. The Court rejected the contention that the 
new rule should not be retroactively applied to con-
tracts concluded before the decision was an-
nounced. 
Court have likewise in a number of tax cases 
involving taxable events which occurred before the 
time of an overruling decision, held that the over-
ruling decision should be applied retroactively so 
as to result in the imposition of taxes to an extent 
which would not have been permitted while the 
overruling case had not yet been overruled.Sunray 
Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F 2d 962 (10th Cir. 1945); 
Cert. den. 325 U.S. 861, 89 Led 1982; Massaglia v .. Com-
miss;oner, 286 F 2d 258 (10th Cir. 1961); Legg's Estate v. 
Commissioner, 114 F. 2d 760 (4th Cir. 1940). 
The State Courts have likewise been flexible in 
arriving at different cut-off dates based upon the 
particular circumstances of each case. The Utah 
Supreme Court in Hamilton v. Salt Lake County Sewerage 
Improvement District No. I, 15 Utah 2d 216, 390 P 2d 235 
(1964) gave "limited retroactive effect" to that de-
cision. In order to alleviate any fears the amicus had 
in that case the Court indicated that Hamilton would 
not effect "similar cases" where the issuance of 
bonds had become fait accompli and the time for 
protest under Utah Code Ann. § 17-6-3.11 (1953 as 
amended) had expired. In effect the Court was ap-
plying that decision retroactively for those cases not 
yet barred by the above Statute of Limitations. 
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In Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Arizona 
384, 381 P. 2d 107 (1963) the Court in a case involv-
ing a wrongful death action abolished the doctrine 
of governmental immunity from tort liability and 
applied that new doctrine to the facts in that case. 
In doing so, the Court not only abolished the doc-
trine as to that case but also expressly abolished it 
as to all pending cases, those not yet filed, those 
which were not barred by the Statute of Limitations, 
and as to all further causes of action. 
In Scheele v. City of Anchorage, Alaska, 385 P 2d 582 
(1963) the Trial Court granted Summary Judgment 
for the City on grounds of governmental immunity. 
The plaintiff in that case appealed contending that 
the Court should have applied the prior decision of 
Fairbanks v. Schaible, 357 P 2d 201, retroactively to him 
despite the fact that the events which gave 
rise to his claim occurred before the Fairbanks 
decision was handed down. The Supreme Court ac-
cepted that argument and held the new rule of law 
applied to those events which occurred before Fair· 
banks was handed down, as well as all other pend-
ing cases, those not yet filed and not barred by the 
Statute of Limitations. 
It doesn't seem fair or logical to still approve 
of Worthen, but yet apply McConnel to Walton and 
Simmons whose claims both arose almost six (6) 
months after the claim in Worthen and which 
weren't even the subject of litigation until after 
Worthen. This Court should discard the arbitrary 
cut-off date of the Worthen decision. The Courts 
present decision won't even reward the litigant who 
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wins the race to the Courthouse since it is possible 
one might have his case heard first but decided 
after a case which was heard later. Prospective lim-
itation of VJ orthen will retard judicial efficiency. It 
will force judges to apply simultaneously two dif-
ferent rules - one of them acknowledged to be 
"wrong" - to claims which arose at similar points 
in time. We ask the Court to consider the following 
problems which the Court's present decision creates: 
In Worthen, this Court on April 3, 1967, affirmed the 
District Court's March 25, 1966 decision setting forth 
a new rule. In the future when District Courts apply 
new rules which are appealed, must they await until 
that decision is affirmed to apply that new rule 
to other cases? If not, won't those cases to \vliich the 
District Court subsequently applies the new rule be 
reversed in the event this Court as in Worthen ap-
plies the new law only the overruling case itself 
.:md not to cases arising thereafter? 
POINT TWO 
THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION REQUIRE THAT THOSE 
CASES SIMILARLY SITUATED RECEIVE EQUAL 
TREATMENT. 
Where a law is not being applied equally to 
those governed by that law, the above constitutional 
provisions require that any such disparity in treat-
ment be reasonable. In application this means (1) 
the classification must be a rational one bearing some 
reasonable relationship to the object of the legisla-
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tion, and (2) that all persons within the classes estab-
lished must be treated equally. In determining 
whether the above constitutional provisions have 
been violated the test is not the form in which the 
state power has been applied but by whatever 
forms, whether such power has in fact been exer-
cised unfair 1 y. 
The Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356 (1886) made it quite clear that not only must 
a statute be non-discriminatory, but it must also be 
applied in a non-discriminatory manner. In that case, 
a statute provided that laundries in wooden build-
ings-as distinguished from brick or stone buildings 
-could not be carried on without a license. The 
classification itself appeared impartial and not un-
reasonable, but in application the licensing author-
ity consistently refused licenses to Chinese appli-
cants and granted licenses to non-Chinese. Since 
the statute was being applied with an "unequal 
hand" it was held to be in violation of the federal 
"equal protection clause." 
It is a fundamental requirement in our law that 
like cases should receive like treatment, that there 
should be no discrimination between one litigant 
and another except based upon some relevant dif-
ferentiating fact. This value of equality appears to 
be at the heart of our notions of justice. Equality of 
treatment to those similarly situated demands that 
this Court which on April 3, 1967, applied the Worth-
en rule to a claim arising on March 18, 1966, apply 
that same new rule to Walton and Simmons 
whose claims arose after the claim in Worthen. 
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POINT THREE 
THE CONCURRING OPINION IS IN ERROR SINCE IT 
IS BASED ON A NEW DEFENSE NOT EVEN ASSERT-
ED BY APPELLANT AT TRIAL OR EVEN ON AP-
PEAL. 
The concurring opinion is based on a defense 
which was never presented by the Appellant at 
either the Trial Court level or on this appeal and 
should therefore not be followed. This Court in 
Teamsters Lo c fll Univn No. 222 v. W. S. Hatch Co., 
20 Utah 2d, 226; 436 P 2d 790 (1968) faced 
cal defense which was urged for the first · ''H- on 
appeal and rejected it summarily as being too late. 
In the Hatch case, the dissenting opinion urged un-
successfully that the Court should adopt the law as 
set forth in 40 Am. Jur. § 155, as follows: 
"Payments which are voluntarily made cannot 
be recovered, but recovery may be had of pay-
ments made as the result of duress, fraud, 
mistake, or failure bl consideration. In fact, it 
has been said that lhese are the only grounds 
upon which a suit to recover back money paid 
may be maintained." 
Not onlyi s the above referred to law being urged 
too late, it in fact does permit recovery as a result 
of duress, mistake, or failure itf consideration. Had 
the above defense been timely asserted the evi-
dence would have established that Respondents 
paymnts were not "voluntarily" made but instead 
were coerced by the State Insurance Fund in return 
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for its agreement to endorse the settlement check 
on which it was named a co-payee. The above com-
mon law statement is likewise not applicable for the 
reason that Respondents claims are based on a spe-
cific statutory right not a contractual right. 
WHEREFORE, we respectfully petition this Hon-
orable Court to reconsider its decision as it applies 
to the speciaJ facts in Walton and Simmons whose 
r:laims c1rose after the claim in Worthen. 
Dated this 3rd day of March, 1970. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FORD G. SCALLEY 
Attorney for Petitioners 
Jeanette Walton and 
Boyd Simmons 
404 Kearns Building 




TIME PATH COMPARISONS OF WORTHEN, WALTON, AND SIMMONS 
Wrong u eat 
suit filed Federal 
District Court 
Feb. II, 1964 
AccH:Jent suit 
filed Feb. 15, 
1965 
*Settlement and 
payment into Court 
Mar. 18, 1966 
Judgment obtained 
Nov. 22, 1964 Appeal to Circuit Court 
cc1 ent suit 
filed Federal 
District Court 
Mor. 30, 1965 
* Date when claim arose in each case. 
1str1ct ourt or ere 
Insurance Fund to 
pay attorney fee App ea I ta S up rem e Court 
Supreme Court affirmed 
District Court Order 
Apr. 3, 1967 Mar. 25, 1966 
Circuit Court affirmed 
Judgment on 
Aug. 31, 1966 
*Payment under 
protest to Fund 
Dec. 21, 1966 
*Sett ement an 
payment to Fund 
under protest 
Jan. 31, 1967 
Suit filed 
against Fund 
Jan. 20, 1969 
Suit filed 
against Fund 
Jan. 20, 1969 
